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Conflicts In The Caucasus Olga Vassilieva |
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Introduction
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Excluding Chechnya, the current situation in the Caucasus can be described in the best way by the formula “no peace, no war.” The unstable balance might be easily broken. At present, most conflicts in the Caucasus are frozen. The implementation of specific forms of consociational democracy settled ethnic tensions in autonomous republics of the North Caucasus. Ethnic cleansing along with the separation of conflicting groups by third-part intervention stopped conflicts in Northern Ossetia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, although the peace there might turn into a new conflict at any moment. In the North Caucasus, both major tendencies - return to the inter-ethnic confrontation as well as the transition to more stable forms of consociational democracy - can come true with almost equal probability. The realization of a particular variant will depend on the combination of many factors - the ability of the federal center and local authorities to overcome socio-economic crisis; the development of cooperative institutions and rules accepted by all major political actors; the openness of decision making process, especially in conflict regions; and the transfer of power and responsibilities to the local level. The East Caucasian region has the most unfavorable economic, social and demographic conditions in comparison with other parts of the Caucasus. The Ossetino-Ingushen conflict led to ethnic cleansing of the Ingushen population from the North Ossetia, but Ingushens hope to return their houses in the future. The federal center might solve this problem by paying for properties for Ingushens in other regions. However, the corruption at different levels results in the situation when population itself has not received sufficient funding. In Dagestan, consensus among major ethnic groups about the power distribution and ethnic quotas in the government and parliament was confirmed by the 1994 Constitution. However, the hard socio-economic situation in the republic undermines all political efforts. The Russian war against Chechnya (1994-96, 1998-currently), although prevents other conflicts from the development, has threatened the stability in the long run perspective. Socio-economic conditions in the West Caucasus are more favorable. Preconditions for new ethnic mobilization, however, have preserved in Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkesia. These republics failed to elaborate their own models of ethnic representation in power structures. Disputes among ethnic elites rise time to time. These disputes can lead to mass mobilization of ethnic groups as it happened, for example, in Karachevo-Cherkesia after the 1997 presidential elections, when the Karachaev won. After numerous Abazin and Cherkess meetings of protest, the federal authority abolished the results of the elections. In Adygheya, the political domination of the titular ethnic group guaranteed by the Constitution has led to tensions between Adyghens and Russians, which have numerically dominated in the republic. In the Transcaucasian states, “freezing” of conflicts resulted from the fact that central governments of Georgia or Azerbaijan de-facto lost the control over republics. This situation can easily turn into inter-ethnic conflicts again. For example, until now, the central government and political forces in Georgia are not ready to recognize the federal structure of the state, which provoked conflicts in the 1990s. In turn, the Abkhazian and South-Ossetian governments have insisted on an independent status, after winning the wars and cleansing the Georgian population. The fragile balance might be easily broken if Georgian central governments tries to restore control by using military forces.
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Current Situation